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Causality as Validity: Some implications for the Social Sciences 
 
 
Abstract 
   
We analyse the concept of causality in the social sciences, whose development is 
insufficient and lesser than the methodology developed for its study. The nature of the causal 
process as the production of effects remains unclear and the relationships considered to be 
manifestations of that process cannot be taken for proof of its existence. Given these 
difficulties, we suggest that, aside from the inherited interpretations, the practice of the 
concept of causality makes reference to correctly specified relationships not confounded by 
others; characteristics identical to those which define validity. In that way, causality is 
equivalent to the validity of a relationship. Beyond merely re-understanding causality, this 
proposal permits the deduction that the temporal precedence of the cause is a necessary 
condition only for one type of causality, making it possible to consider other types, not 
admitted by the traditional notion, in which the cause is consequent or simultaneous to the 
variable to be explained. Examples and characteristics of these types of causality are presented 
and considered to be useful for the social sciences.   
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1. Introduction 
Causality is a central theme in the methodology of the social and natural sciences, which 
corresponds to the relevant place it holds in our culture (Thompson, 1993). In that sense, 
experimental methodology holds the study of causal relations as its objective, and the 
possibilities for the evaluation of causal models for non-experimental data in the social 
sciences has increased greatly in recent years (e.g. Aickin, 2001; Bentler, 1985; Bollen, 1989; 
Bollen & Long, 1993; Dalhbäck, 2001; Hayduk, 1987; James et al., 1982; Jöreskog & 
Sörbom, 1988; Long, 1983; Mc Donald, 1985; Muthén, 1987; Seidel & Eicheler, 1990). 
This methodological development has been accompanied by a broad consensus about the 
nature and characteristics of causality: a) It is understood as a process of production or 
transmission of forces by which the cause brings about the effect; b) It is considered that that 
process is manifested in specific relationships and that it appears when certain variables, such 
as common causes and intervening variables, which may influence the components of the 
relationship under study, are controlled (Wright, 1934, 1960; Simon, 1954; Blalock, 1962; 
1964; Duncan, 1966). Relationships which do not occur under these conditions are 
considered to be spurious or indirect, products of other variables, except in the case of 
omission of another variable – termed a suppressing variable– with similar effects, but of the 
opposite sign, on the variables of a causal relationship (Pedhazur, 1982; Bollen, 1989). 
Finally, c) It is understood that, as manifestations of a process of production, causal 
relationships are temporally asymmetrical or directional from the cause to the effect. 
 However, such consensus certainly does not translate into a clear concept of the 
supposed process of production, which is therefore maintained as one of the frequently 
discussed themes in social science (Doreian, 2001; Notterman, 2004). As Kenny (1979: 4) 
affirmed, "It is difficult to convey this notion of causality formally, just as it is to formally 
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define space or time". The principle difficulties of each one of the indicated characteristics are 
the following, respectively:  a) That link is not explained beyond the general declaration that 
the cause is the generating force of the effect. What exactly the nature of a causal force is and 
what causal forces in different areas, such as mechanical physics and social processes, have in 
common, are questions which are not answered, despite being basic for the postulation of the 
existence of that causal force; a force said to be "almost vitalistic," given its lack of definition 
(Kenny, 1979: 4); b) The supposition that the causal force has an existence which is made 
manifest in specific relationships has not been validated, given that the force is not defined 
independently of the studied relationships. These relationships may not be considered to be 
the manifestation or proof of the existence of a force which is itself exclusively defined by 
those relationships. It is simply a circular argument which cannot validate what it intends to, 
and ; c) Although the temporal asymmetry or direction of the causal relationships is clearly 
identified in terms of the precedence of a variable, the temporally asymmetric relationship is 
not a characteristic specific to causation, for example the succession “cockcrow - sunrise”.  
  Thus, although the causal theme in the social sciences presents an important 
development of formal procedures, it has serious difficulty to define and validate the supposed 
existence of a causal force of production. As have indicated Glymour et al. (1989: 58), 
"mathematical representation is the easiest part; the hard part concerns what inferences are to 
be drawn from causal claims", which is due precisely to the poor definition of these claims. It 
appears that there exists a conceptual problem regarding the causal process – a problem 
compounded by the existing procedures for the study of relationships. To have procedures for 
the purpose of studying something which is poorly defined is a situation which should be 
reconsidered in order to recover the sense of the procedures and of the causal notion itself. It is 
a problem most likely linked to the insufficient attention paid by methodology, as has been 
 
 5 
indicated by others: "A basic introduction to the concept of causal theories is hard to find, 
since most of the time the discussion is already put in mathematical form" (Saris & 
Stronkhorst, 1984: 22). Frequently, methodological work on causality attributes the 
insufficiencies in definition to lapses in the philosophy of science. That would show that the 
social sciences have neglected to undertake the necessary conceptual analysis, passing it on to 
philosophy. Nonetheless, given that that attitude has not been satisfactory, it would appear 
reasonable to approach the causal question from scientific methodology itself, analysing its 
specific bases and practices.     
 
2. Causality as validity 
As a starting point, we consider that the existing methodological procedures and their 
continuous application express the concept of causality actually used in scientific practice – a 
concept which, nonetheless, appears to be masked by the usual and inherited interpretation of 
causality as a force of production. In our opinion, to adequately define the concept of causality 
does not insist that one questions the action of the supposed force, but that one questions the 
facts which are under investigation, and are considered to be reasonable, when researchers 
claim to be studying causality. Such as with any other concept, it may be true for causality that 
in identifying the situations in which a community considers the use of the concept to be 
adequate, we are demonstrating the meaning which that community gives it in practice 
(Wittgenstein, 1953), coinciding or not with the way that that community describes that 
practice itself. Therefore, to identify the current concept of causality in the social sciences 
demands the analysis of the facts used in the methodological bibliography as characteristics of 
causality, despite the interpretations which have been superimposed over them; analysing 
what they do, more than what it is said that they do. That should be the necessary and 
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sufficient material to meet the indicated objective. 
In the methodological bibliography of the social sciences, principally constituted of 
structural equation models (SEM), causality is referred to in terms of relationships (e.g. Bollen 
& Long, 1993; Dalhbäck, 2001; Hayduk, 1987; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1988; Seidel & 
Eicheler, 1990). A large part of the relationships of many variables xj with other variables yi 
may be indicated by the additive linear model 
 yi = γi1x1 + γi2x2+...+ γiqxq + ζi          (1)             
where each ij is the expected change in yi for a one-unit change in x1 when the rest of the 
variables are maintained constant, and where ζi represents the random component of yi or the 
effects of variables such as errors of measurement or characteristics which are unknown or of 
little relevance and are therefore not included in the model as independent variables.   
The mentioned expression takes into account that the variables of each studied 
relationship may be related to other variables which they should not confound. Thus, when 
studying each relationship (yi, xj) in equations like (1), it is required that the variables 
contained in ζi, beyond merely having minimal effects and constant variance, are not related 
among themselves nor among the variables xj, meaning that E(ζi)=0,  V(ζi)=σζi
2
, COV(ζiζi')=0 
for all ii', and COV(ζixj)=0, for all i and j.  This demands the inclusion of the maximum 
number of relevant variables, and demands that their control is carried out by operations 
previous to data collection and/or by statistical means, in experimental or non-experimental 
research. This is what Steyer et al. (2000) have indicated in terms of causal unbiasedness and 
unconfoundedness. Additionally, when representative inclusion and control of variables are 
not sufficient, assumptions or partial restrictions must be made, evaluating the possible 
relevance of each one of them by successive replications.   
Some conclusions may be extracted from what has been expressed.  While the 
 
 7 
traditional notion of causality is understood as a process of production of facts, which is 
manifested in controlled relationships between variables, in practice regulated by the scientific 
methodology of SEM, it occurs that: 1) The meaning of causality is exclusively referred to as 
adequately specified or represented relationships, not confounded by other variables. 2) These 
two characteristics also define the validity of a relationship, (Kerlinger, 1973; Shadish et al,  
2002). In consequence, to identify a relationship as causal is simply, in practice, to identify it 
as valid. 3) Causality then is formed by the relationships subject to study and by those others 
which must not confound the first, which means that these and other relationships are equally 
as necessary and that neither is sufficient to establish causality.  Aside from this conjunction, 
it is true that "correlation does not prove causation" and that "a lack of correlation does not 
disprove causation" (Bollen, 1989: 52). Finally, 4) the notion sets the causal theme in 
identifiable terms and rescues it from interpretations with problems of definition or 
verification; the adequately specified and not confounded relationships should be recognised 
as necessary and sufficient material to constitute the meaning of causality, instead of being 
underestimated as simple manifestations of supposed underlying processes never defined 
independently with respect to those relationships.  
To assume the previously enumerated ideas permits a different and perhaps more 
significant way of thinking about the two characteristics of the traditional notion: Causal 
force, manifested in relationships. Instead of saying that a relationship reflects causal force 
studied through specified and not confounded relationships, it may be said that this 
relationship is termed causal. This last point describes the circumstances in which the concept 
of causality is applied in scientific practice, different from the supposition of a force based on 
data considered to be manifestations of that very force. The causal theme therefore becomes a 
problem for the way it is planted rather than for not having been solved. The conception of 
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causality as the transmission of a hidden force would, by definition, be a superfluous problem 
which could be abandoned.  
 
3. No necessity of temporal asymmetry in causal relationships 
The temporal asymmetry or directionality of relationships, understood as the 
precedence of one variable, is an inevitable characteristic of the assumption of causality as a 
productive force. The supposed transmission of that force between variables may only occur if 
the cause precedes the effect. In consequence, simultaneous relationships are usually ruled out, 
even considering that in relationships of such appearance - such as some from non-recursive 
models - the interval between cause and effect is smaller than the observation interval. Within 
this framework, temporal asymmetry or precedence is not questioned, as it is assumed to be a 
necessary condition for the relationship and any other possibility would be absurd. Keeping 
the precedence of the cause constant, the covariation between cause and effect is studied, but 
not if that covariation depends on the cause preceding the effect.  The same occurs in the case 
of reciprocal causality, in which the cause precedent at time t is the effect variable at a 
posterior time t+k, which assumes bidirectionality or successive temporal asymmetry. 
The basis differs from the notion of causality as validity understood in terms of 
unbiasedness and unconfoundedness. This notion does not include reference to temporal 
asymmetry of causal relationships, which may indicate that this characteristic is not a 
necessary condition for all effects.  This means that the cause or necessary condition for a 
valid relationship must not necessarily be precedent in time, and may have several 
consequences.  One may be that if temporal asymmetry or direction is not a necessary 
condition for causal relationships, then the order of occurrence of determined variables is one 
thing, and quite another is if that precedence is necessary for that relationship.  For that 
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reason, the temporal asymmetry of a determined causal relationship must not be understood as 
the simple precedence of one variable, but as the conditionality one relationship may have 
with respect to the temporal precedence of some of its variables. Also, if the temporal 
precedence of one variable is not a condition for all causal relationships, that means that there 
may be valid causal relationships without this precedence of the variable considered to be the 
cause, occurring simultaneous to the effect or following it. In other words, in accordance with 
the notion of causality as validity used in methodological practice, one may speak of three 
types of causal or valid relationships in function of the temporal location of the cause or 
necessary condition: a) Directional causality with preceding cause; b) Directional causality 
with consequent or posterior cause; and, c) Non-directional causality, with cause simultaneous 
to the effect.  Given the novelty of the latter two types, it is convenient to explore their 
characteristics and present possible examples.  
Abundant examples may be found of directional causal relationships with consequent 
cause in the psychological literature of operant conditioning, with wide generalization across 
species. In any of its variations, the phenomenon is described as the increment of those 
responses of the organism which are followed by determined events or reinforcement. The 
posterior reinforcer is considered the cause of the increase of the behaviour, and the key 
criteria to distinguish between behaviour directed by its consequences and that directed by 
previous stimuli which occur as pavlovian conditioning. Another example of this directional 
causality with consequent cause is found in the explanations of intentional action or 
anticipation-guided ends or goals, such as that found in Action Psychology (e.g. Harré et al, 
1985).   
In reference to non-directional causal relationships, some primary examples may be 
extracted from the work of Kuhn (1977) on causality in physics. Having objectives quite 
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different from ours, that author referred to explicative relationships in which it was senseless 
to search for a precedent causal agent.  One of those was the relationship between the 
elliptical orbit of the planet Mars – considered as a phenomenon to be causally explained – 
and the laws of Newton applied to an isolated system of two bodies which interact with an 
attraction inversely proportional to the square of the distance, and used as causes or 
explanations. That may be an appropriate example of non-directional causality in which, 
assuming the correct specification of the relationship and no confounding with other factors, 
the two variables are simultaneous. In effect, Newton’s model applied to cause or explanation 
is an interpretation or re-reading of the to-be-explained phenomenon.  For that reason, it is 
senseless to speak of temporal precedence of one or another variable, or to say that the 
structure described by the model is previous or posterior to the phenomenon. Similar 
examples may be found among the relationships between determined optical or 
electromagnetic phenomena and determined configurations of their respective fields. Thus 
defined the optical deficiencies of some people, such as farsightedness or the phenomenon of 
the change of light rays when passing through air or water, they are considered to be due to or 
caused by a determined configuration of the field given parameters such as the curvature of the 
lens, the focal distance or the angle between the two. Again, it makes no sense to say that the 
described structure of the model is previous or posterior to the phenomenon which it explains. 
Examples may also be found in the social sciences in the relationships between phenomena-
to-be-explained – such as depression, education or voting behaviour – and models or 
interpretations of those phenomena, when both covary in valid conditions with adequate 
specification and the absence of confounding with other terms.  
From the examples above it is possible to add some comments on the two types 
discussed – simultaneous and posterior causes – in addition to causality with temporal 
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precedence. First, the existence of such relationships should not be surprising once the notion 
of cause as a force or production has been abandoned. There are many factors which do not 
condition all causal relationships, and we do not find any reason why the temporal precedence 
of one of its variables should be an exception. In this sense, a factor such as temporal-spatial 
contiguity between cause and effect, which was taken in the past to be a necessary condition 
for causation, ceases to be considered as such. Second, the three types imply a notion of 
causality in terms of a necessary condition, be they precedent, simultaneous or consequent.  In 
other words, every causal relationship establishes an asymmetry between cause and effect, be 
it temporal, with an antecedent and a consequence, or conceptual as in simultaneous causes in 
which a model is considered to be an explanation of determined facts or data. Third, given 
that the three types of causal relationships include the requirements of adequate specification 
and no confounds, spurious or non-causal relationships are seen as clearly different. Fourth, 
the simultaneous or non-directional category is also different form the reciprocal or 
bidirectional category, where the relationship is conditioned by the precedence of different 
variables at various times, and where the non-directional relationships imply simultaneous 
variables. Fifth, the three types of causal relationships appear to have different functions.  The 
directional relationships – reciprocal or not – take into account transitions or changes in one 
variable based on changes in another previous or posterior variable. The non-directional 
relationships, on the other hand, at least in the above examples, appear to implicate the 
interpretation of one variable based on other, more structured, variables, relationships between 
a fact to be understood and a structural model
1
. Finally, the described categories broaden the 
traditional causal notion of a previous agent, valid in some situations, helping to collect the 
explicative possibilities used by the natural sciences (Kuhn, 1977) and nonetheless to this day 
are not adequately recognised or taken advantage of in the social sciences. 
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4. Conclusions   
The analysis of the criteria used in the methodological practice - structural equation models – 
in the social sciences permits a meaning which reinterprets the usual characteristics of 
causality.  It appears that the material constituted by valid relationships, correctly specified 
and not confounded with others, is sufficient to realise the meaning given to causality in this 
scientific practice. From this point of view, it is unnecessary to consider that material as a 
reflection of a process or underlying force whose existence has never been evaluated 
independently of those relationships. We understand the notion of causality as a process of 
production, be it as a firm ontological belief or as a simple conceptual resource, is a problem 
which greatly distorts the causal theme. For that reason, the question should not be the 
discovery of relationships in which a causal force is identified, but the discovery of certain 
configurations or sets of correctly specified and not confounded among one another. To 
contemplate causality in terms of validity permits us to consider that the cause or necessary 
condition need not be precedent but also posterior or simultaneous to the variable which it 
explains, and therefore allows us to approach non-directional causality.   
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Note. 
1. The proposed types may represent the four aristotelian types of causality.  The relationship of the 
precedent cause appears to correspond to causality of the efficient type, those of consequent cause to 
final causality and those non-directional causal relationships to the formal and material types, in which 
a variable is explained by being validly related to a representation or model of its structure or of its 
component elements, respectively. 
